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I. INTRODUCTION
TO DATE, NO SINGLE WORK has proposed a federal, uni-form approach for conflicts of law aviation cases. Some au-
thors and experts have proposed federal regulation over the
entire conflict of laws issue;1 others have argued against it.2 This
Comment proposes an approach much narrower for aviation-
specific cases. Particular interstate aviation cases should be regu-
lated by a uniform approach to conflict of laws, federally regu-
lated under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, which would
ensure a decrease in forum shopping and an increase in predict-
ability. This approach strives to treat like cases alike by providing
litigants and their attorneys with predictability in the pretrial
process. As one writer stressed, “[a]lthough aviation cases re-
present only a small fraction of tort cases generally, they consti-
tute a remarkably large percentage of the historic choice of law
cases.”3
This Comment begins by summarizing the current conflict of
laws system in the United States and three major issues accom-
panying the current system that leave conflict of laws rules in the
hands of state legislatures to determine. The Comment then
moves to conflict of laws in aviation cases specifically, and it ex-
plains the unique nature of the aviation industry and why such
1 See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J.
527, 528–29 (2000); James A.R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Com-
plex Litigation Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1003, 1014 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Robert J. Witte, . . . Or Would You Rather Have What’s Behind Door
Number Two? Uniform Choice of Law Proposals: Big Deal of the Day or Just Another
Zonk?, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 617, 619, 640 (1994).
3 2 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 16.01[5] (Justin T. Green ed.,
rev. ed. 2019); see also Michael S. Gill, Turbulent Times or Clear Skies Ahead?: Conflict
of Laws in Aviation Delict and Tort, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 195, 218 (1998).
2019] CONFLICT OF LAWS 547
regulation is needed in this field of law. Thereafter, this Com-
ment discusses Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause
and asks whether federal regulation is in fact a viable and consti-
tutional solution to current conflict of laws issues. The Com-
ment then discusses the realities and potential implications of
applying a uniform, federal standard to aviation cases with con-
flict of laws issues, and it explores why aviation cases specifically
are in such need of reform. Finally, the Comment analyzes po-
tential opposition and challenges regarding federal regulation
of conflict of laws, and it suggests their flaws and proposes alter-
native views to address these concerns.
II. AMERICA’S CURRENT CONFLICT OF LAWS SYSTEM
“Perhaps no legal subject has caused more consternation and
confusion among the bench and bar than choice of law.”4 No
matter its high level of complication, the choice of law analysis is
often determinative of the outcome of a case.5 Choice of law:
[C]oncerns the rights of persons within the territory and domin-
ion of one sovereignty by reason of acts, public or private, done
within the territory of another sovereignty, and is based on the
broad general principle that one sovereignty or forum will re-
spect and give effect to the laws of another so far as can be done
consistently with its own interests.6
Conflicts of laws7 are “difference[s] between the laws of two or
more jurisdictions with some connection to a case, such that the
4 Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041,
1041 (1987).
5 Id. at 1042.
6 H. Norman Kinzy, Current Aviation Decisions in Conflict of Laws, 41 J. AIR L. &
COM. 311, 311 (1975) (citing 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 1(2) (1967); 12 TEX.
JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 1 (1960)).
7 To clarify, “conflict of laws” is used interchangeably in this Comment with
“choice of law.” See Smith, supra note 4, at 1041 n.1 (Choice of law “is the phrase
generally used to describe that branch of the subject of conflict of laws which
deals with the processes by which courts select the substantive law governing par-
ticular cases. The term ‘conflict of laws’ is often used synonymously with ‘choice
of law’ . . . . Literally, however, the former term is broader than the latter, and
includes within its domain such topics as domicile, establishment of jurisdiction,
and enforcement of judgments. Choice of law describes only the process courts
use to determine the applicable law in a case which concerns more than one
jurisdiction.”).
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outcome depends on which jurisdiction’s law will be used to re-
solve each issue in dispute.”8
The question presented by these types of cases is a unique
one—which law will apply?9 Cases stemming from one primary
jurisdiction often leave no doubt as to what law will apply.10
However, where a plane crash occurs, for example, in State A,
the plaintiff is from State B, and the defendant is from State C,
which law will apply is an immediate concern, regardless of the
jurisdiction in which a suit is brought. These multijurisdictional
cases can, and often do, get complicated quickly, just on the ini-
tial question of what law applies.11 Most states have choice of law
rules that follow essentially two steps: (1) the court applies its
jurisdiction’s choice of law rule; and (2) the court applies the
substantive law of the state to which the choice of law rule
points.12 Following the previous example, if the suit is brought
in State B (plaintiff’s home state), the State B court looks to its
own choice of law rule to determine what substantive law to ap-
ply. If State B’s choice of law rule is that the law of the place of
the accident applies in tort cases, for instance, State B then ap-
plies the substantive law of State A (the place where the accident
occurred) to the case.
Conflicts of law cases are further complicated by the numer-
ous choice of law approaches used by courts under state law.13
States have adopted a number of various approaches to conflicts
of law cases, which can lead to different outcomes in similar
cases, merely due to an inconsequential change in facts.14 For
example, under the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and
in states that have adopted this approach, courts use the law of
the lex loci delicti (place of the wrong).15 Yet, the approach pro-
moted by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and
8 Conflict of Laws, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/conflict_of_laws [https://perma.cc/7U89-VGUA] (last visited Nov. 11,
2019).
9 See Elliott E. Cheatham, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 164, 165 (1941) (reviewing A.H. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1940)).
10 See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1004.
11 Id. at 1006 (highlighting that “[w]ithin the federal system, any of the more
than 50 bodies of choice-of-law rules and procedures” could apply to these mul-
tijurisdictional cases).
12 Cheatham, supra note 9, at 166.
13 See generally Smith, supra note 4.
14 See id. at 1043–50 (explaining each of the different conflict of laws ap-
proaches and applications).
15 See Gill, supra note 3, at 218–19.
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adopted by other states endorses the “most significant relation-
ship” test, which applies the law of the state that has the most
significant relationship to the facts of the case.16 In addition to a
number of other approaches adopted by other states,17 these dif-
ferent approaches lead to different outcomes for relatively simi-
lar cases.18
Continuing the example from above, State B will apply the law
of the place of the accident to this plaintiff, but what about a
plaintiff from State D (Plaintiff Two) involved in the same acci-
dent? If Plaintiff Two brings suit in State D regarding the same
accident, but State D applies the “most significant relationship”
test, Plaintiff Two’s recovery possibilities, and likely the outcome
of his entire case, will change merely because of a negligible
fact—he lives in a different state than the first plaintiff.19
With states applying different choice of law approaches to the
same or similar cases,20 “the parties cannot know what law gov-
erns their conduct until after they have acted. The resulting un-
certainty is unfair, and it discourages desirable interstate
activity.”21 Many legal scholars have written knowledgeable and
innovative articles on solutions to this discrepancy and the un-
fair treatment of different plaintiffs due to mirror differences in
their cases.22 This inconsistency in like cases often leads to fo-
rum shopping, unpredictable outcomes, and different results
for similarly situated plaintiffs, as discussed below.23
16 See id. at 224–25.
17 See id. at 222, 226–37 (introducing and analyzing several of the other choice
of law approaches).
18 See Kimberlee S. Cagle, The Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for
International Aviation Accidents, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 953, 998 (1986) (“[U]nder the
present law, similarly situated passengers suffering identical injuries on the same
flight can recover vastly different damage amounts.”).
19 It is important here to emphasize the problem to avoid confusion. It is not
that the plaintiffs are from different jurisdictions that leads to unfair discrepancy
in the results but rather the different jurisdictional applications of conflict of laws
rules to the plaintiffs.
20 See Cagle, supra note 18, at 987–89.
21 Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV.
2134, 2137 (1991).
22 See, e.g., id.
23 See, e.g., Cagle, supra note 18, at 989 (“[C]hoice of law analysis can lead to
widely divergent damage awards. Even among similarly situated passengers, the
damage awards can be strikingly disparate.”).
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A. FORUM SHOPPING
Forum shopping can be innocently described as “the exercise
of the plaintiff’s option to bring a lawsuit in one of several differ-
ent courts.”24 Yet, another definition sheds more light on the
issues behind and common abuse of forum shopping: “[s]uch
occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a partic-
ular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most
favorable judgment or verdict.”25 With broad avenues for estab-
lishing jurisdiction over a defendant and proper venue for a
case, allowing plaintiffs to essentially handpick where to bring
suit gives plaintiffs an advantage in a case from the time suit is
filed. As one author bluntly stated, “[h]orizontal (state-state) fo-
rum shopping is a serious problem.”26 The United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the forum shopping
problem
stems from the fear that a plaintiff will be able to determine the
outcome of a case simply by choosing the forum in which to
bring the suit . . . raising the fear that applying the law sought by
a forum-shopping plaintiff will defeat the expectations of the de-
fendant or will upset the policies of the state in which the defen-
dant acted (or from which the defendant hails).27
Professor Earl Martz further highlighted prevalent issues with
forum shopping:
The American system . . . envisions a set of fora in which it would
be fair for the defendant to be forced to litigate. The plaintiff has
the power to choose any forum within that set as the venue for
the lawsuit. If the plaintiff chooses a court that is not within the
set of fair fora, the defendant has the right to veto the plaintiff’s
choice, but the defendant generally does not have the right to
designate the specific court that will hear the lawsuit. The key
question is not whether the plaintiff has chosen the forum that
would be most appropriate to hear the lawsuit; instead, the only
issue is whether the court selected by the plaintiff is included in
the set of fair fora.28
24 Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 553, 554 (1989).
25 Forum Shopping, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
26 See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1013.
27 Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 855 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Olmstead
v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 303 (Mich. 1987)).
28 Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: A Recon-
sideration of Erie Principles, 79 KY. L.J. 231, 249 (1991) (citations omitted).
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Simply put, it is fundamentally unfair to allow plaintiffs to
“shop” for the court which would allow the most favorable out-
come rather than the court that is most appropriate to hear the
suit.29
Admittedly, the forum shopping problem, also rooted in
many other American judicial rules (jurisdiction, venue, etc.), is
not choice of law specific.30 Yet, its effects are well apparent in
the choice of law realm.31 It has been proposed that the main
purpose of the creation of the conflict of laws system was to pre-
vent forum shopping. However, that has proven to be a moot
goal given the manipulation by plaintiffs and “home-town jus-
tice” taken by courts.32 Further, the current conflicts system has
been attributed as a leading cause in the forum shopping prob-
lem in the United States.33 Inappropriate forum shopping is
promoted by the current state of the conflict of laws system.
Without a “clear, uniform, and neutral” context for the applica-
ble law to be chosen, “modern U.S. conflicts doctrine encour-
ages plaintiffs to practice forum shopping on the basis of other
factors,” and “[w]hen plaintiffs see conflicts doctrine existing in
many states that is not clearly contrary to their substantive inter-
ests, that they detect is malleable, and that tends generally to be
pro-recovery,” they choose those forums.34
B. UNPREDICTABILITY
Because of the forum shopping problem and various ap-
proaches used by states, unpredictability has surfaced as another
29 It seems appropriate here to distinguish between “forum shopping” and a
plaintiff deciding where to file suit among a list of appropriate jurisdictions. “Fo-
rum shopping,” as used here, denotes “a litigant who . . . unfairly exploits jurisdic-
tional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit.” Juenger, supra note 24,
at 553. This is not to be confused with a litigant who chooses between jurisdic-
tions, each of which is a valid venue, as such a choice is an essential part of the
American judicial system.
30 Id. at 557–60 (noting that other features of the American judicial system,
such as personal jurisdiction, recognition rules, and venue, also encourage forum
shopping).
31 See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, Inter-
national and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 564 (2002).
32 Juenger, supra note 24, at 559.
33 Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 481, 495 (2011) (explaining how the “choice-of-law revolution” led to a
“strong bias in favor of” courts applying the forum’s law).
34 Whitten, supra note 31, at 564.
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issue under the current conflict of laws rules in America.35 “Even
when only one choice-of-law approach applies in a case, it may
not provide the necessary measure of predictability, uniformity,
and ease of administration in a complicated, high-stake aviation
case.”36 While the current rules should, in theory, provide liti-
gants and courts with consistency and predictability, scholars
often stress the “unpredictable (and sometimes unprincipled)
outcomes generated by [conflict of laws] rules, and the fact that
their content may vary from state to state.”37 This has led to diffi-
culty “predict[ing] what a court will do when faced with choice
of law issues, and each case seems to demand an ad hoc determi-
nation.”38 The modern-day, American conflict of laws system has
been regarded as producing “almost totally unpredictable
results.”39
The importance of predictability is clear. “Predictability in
conflicts law is as important as it is in substantive law.”40 As one
scholar stressed the importance of predictability: “Outcome pre-
diction has always been a vital part of practicing law. Clients of
all types rely on their attorneys to provide accurate assessments
of the potential legal consequences the clients face when mak-
ing important decisions.”41 A lawyer should be able to “assess the
merits” of a case “to evaluate the likelihood of success.”42 With-
out clear predictability in the judicial system, especially with al-
ready complicated conflicts of law cases, lawyers are unable to
provide clients with adequate representation and accurate as-
sessment of cases.43
35 See Cagle, supra note 18, at 999 (“Currently, choice of law analysis provides
no uniformity among damage awards to similarly situated passengers.”).
36 Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1009.
37 See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV.
343, 346 (2011).
38 Shirley A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws “Restatements”: Merging Judicial Discre-
tion and Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
39 Michael Bogdan, Conflict of Laws in Air Crash Cases: Remarks from a European’s
Perspective, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 303, 343 (1988).
40 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 106 (3d ed. 2000).
41 Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome
Prediction in the Practice of Law, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 101 (2018).
42 Id. at 47.
43 See id. at 46–47.
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C. INCONSISTENCY AND NOT TREATING LIKE CASES ALIKE
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,44 as former Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, “embodies a
general rule that States must treat like cases alike . . . .”45 Yet,
due to the variations in conflict of laws approaches across state
lines and forum favoritism practiced by courts under the current
conflict of laws system in the United States, like cases are not
treated alike.46 Allowing each state to have its own conflict of
laws approach means that, especially in aviation cases, factors
typically out of the control of litigants, such as the location of a
plane crash or flight pattern, can become outcome determina-
tive for cases. This leads to plaintiffs involved in the same or
similar events possibly having different case results merely be-
cause of the forum.47
Forum favoritism, on the other hand, also leads to inconsis-
tency in case outcomes, even for similarly situated litigants. As
one author put it, “[e]scape devices—such as characterization,
renvoi, and the public policy reservation—enabled judges to ap-
ply forum law in spite of rigid choice-of-law rules . . . .”48 Further,
another scholar concluded that “there is theoretical and empiri-
cal support for the proposition that modern choice-of-law theo-
ries inevitably tend to hold against defendants in general and
out-of-state defendants in particular.”49 Allowing judges to avoid
established rules and practice forum favoritism creates predict-
ability issues as well as fundamental unfairness in case
outcomes.50
These issues—forum shopping, unpredictability, and inconsis-
tency—are three of the main problems with the current conflict
of laws system in America. While these problems exist through-
out the conflicts system as a whole, there are particularly con-
cerning implications for aviation cases specifically that show the
necessity of federal regulation of the conflict of laws system for
aviation cases.
44 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
46 See Cagle, supra note 18, at 998–99.
47 See id.
48 See Juenger, supra note 24, at 559; see also Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1014
(“courts would do well to minimize exceptions to the rules of preference. They
are the most troublesome feature”).
49 Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
GA. L. REV. 49, 89 (1989).
50 See, e.g., Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1014.
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D. A UNIFORM APPROACH—OVERCOMING VARIABILITY ISSUES
If each state applied the same conflict of laws approach,
choice of law issues would be more predictable and arguably
fairer, especially in the context of uncontrollable accidents and
insignificant differences in cases. The problem, however, is that
getting all states to agree on one approach to conflict of laws
would be nearly impossible.51 Instead, a more practical solution
to this problem would be federal regulation. Congress creating
one approach for multistate aviation cases would allow clearer
application of the law and more predictability.
1. Limiting Forum Shopping
As discussed above, forum shopping is a prevalent issue within
the conflict of laws system, and “[i]t is simply not fair that one
party gets to choose, after the fact, what legal regime will govern
the parties’ dispute.”52 Yet, this problem could be limited by a
uniform approach to the conflicts system. A single approach
used by all states would limit forum shopping in an obvious way.
Plaintiffs could no longer consider the choice of law rules in
different forums in deciding where to bring suit. If a plaintiff
knows one uniform conflict of laws approach will be used re-
gardless of where suit is brought, the strategic and sometimes
outcome-determinative advantage that plaintiffs have in choos-
ing forum is limited to more appropriate forums, versus a forum
that merely meets jurisdictional requirements and has a plain-
tiff-friendly choice of law approach.
2. Providing Predictability
A uniform approach would also bring predictability to compli-
cated conflicts of law cases. In aviation cases specifically, con-
sumers and airlines alike, as possible litigants for events
occurring in the process of a flight, would know up-front what
the conflict of laws rule would be for any possible suit. “The vari-
ety, ambiguity, and instability of the rules and principles that
underlie modern choice of law processes in the United States
pose particular problems in air disaster cases.”53 The proposed
single approach in aviation conflicts of law cases would provide
51 A prime example of this would be the state of the conflict of laws system
currently. Even with Restatement guidance, courts in different jurisdictions are
unable to provide a uniform approach across state lines.
52 Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, supra note 1, at 529.
53 Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1009.
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predictability to cases that are often decided by uncontrollable
factors.54 Parties should, and do, want to “know what the law
requires of them.”55 As one author explained, when activity is
interstate in nature, it “requires knowing which state’s law will
govern. . . . [I]f the criteria for choosing law are so amorphous
that parties can’t tell which state’s law will apply, or if that
choice will vary depending on the plaintiff’s post hoc forum se-
lection, then the defendant-actor cannot know what law to
obey.”56 Providing predictability to these aviation cases allows
parties to be attentive of the possible laws to which they could be
subjected. “Federal law would eliminate costly uncertainty and
create uniformity. . . . lead[ing] to a quick and efficient resolu-
tion of mass disaster cases.”57
3. Treating Like Cases Alike
A uniform approach would not only reduce forum shopping
and provide predictability to future litigants but also provide an-
other level of fairness to aviation conflicts of law cases by treat-
ing like cases alike, which former Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained is a requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.58
Providing one conflict of laws approach to all cases, particularly
those with similarly situated litigants, prevents inapplicable fac-
tors such as a plaintiff’s home state or the fortuitous location of
a plane crash from automatically changing the outcome of a
case.
It has been stated that “[t]he right to a fair and impartial trial
in a civil case is as fundamental as it is in a criminal case.”59
Ensuring that improper forum shopping is eliminated, predict-
ability is established, and like cases are treated alike promotes a
fair trial for litigants in conflicts of law cases. As explained by
one scholar:
[T]he choice of law rules the state courts have applied in the
absence of federal command have become chaotic producers of
waste and unfairness; and . . . [relaxed constraints on] state court
jurisdiction and state court application of forum law have intensi-
54 See Gill, supra note 3, at 238.
55 Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, supra note 1, at 528.
56 Id.
57 In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1455
(D. Colo. 1988).
58 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997); cf. Cagle, supra note 18, at 999.
59 Roberts v. CSX Transp., Inc., 688 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. 2010) (citations
omitted).
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fied the forum shopping and forum-preference in selection of
law that lie at the heart of the present problem.60
This statement highlights that protection from these issues is
necessary for justice to be served appropriately in conflicts of law
cases, and these safeguards would be most effectively accom-
plished through one conflict of laws approach across all states.
III. CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AVIATION CASES—THE
NEED FOR ONE CONFLICT OF LAWS APPROACH
Problems with the conflicts system are exceedingly evident in
the field of aviation due to the inherent multistate nature of the
industry. “The most common issues [arising out of claims from
air disasters] are liability, survivability of actions after the death
of a tortfeasor or victim, compensatory damages for injury, loss
of life or loss of property, damages for pain and suffering, and
punitive damages.”61 Airlines carry passengers from all over the
world on flights starting in one state, flying over numerous
others, and landing in a completely different state, causing the
airline to potentially be subject to the laws of any of the states
involved in the flight. As Chief Judge Desmond commented in
one famous conflicts of law case:
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours’
duration pass through several of those commonwealths [that
have laws differing from those of New York]. His plane may meet
with disaster in [a] State he never intended to cross but into
which the plane has flown because of bad weather or other unex-
pected developments, or an airplane’s catastrophic descent may
begin in one State and end in another. The place of the injury
becomes entirely fortuitous.62
Further, “[t]he applicable law is indeed fortuitous because there
is no uniform law of aviation liability among the several states.”63
If an airline conducts a flight from Los Angeles, California, to
New York City, New York,64 it is subject to the possibility that the
laws of California, New York, or any other state it may fly over
60 Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice
of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
61 Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1004.
62 Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. 1961); see Harold E.
McKee, Aviation Law—Problems in Litigation Arising from Aircraft Disasters, 37 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 194, 194 (1961).
63 McKee, supra note 62, at 14.
64 The flight from JFK to LAX is the busiest flight within North America.
Tamara Hardingham-Gill, World’s Most Popular Airplane Journey Revealed, CNN
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could apply to a conflicts of law case. With so many different
approaches used by different states, these airlines and their pas-
sengers are unable to fairly predict which laws may apply if
something were to go wrong on the flight due to the many dif-
ferent variables involved with conflicts of law cases. Even the in-
crease in air travel over the last decade has not led to any
significant reforms to ensure uniformity among the conflict of
laws in aviation litigation.65
Advocating for a federal conflict of laws approach is not novel
on its own. As one author has explained, “[w]hatever the proce-
dural posture of a case, and however neutral the forum may be,
judges should appreciate the need for a multijurisdictional per-
spective that discourages horizonal forum-shopping and maxi-
mizes legitimate expectations of parties and systemic
integrity.”66 Indeed, legal scholars have proposed various sugges-
tions for reform.67 Yet, the concept of federal legislation under
the Commerce Clause for aviation cases specifically is a new area
for legal exploration. However, in order to give a thorough and
accurate analysis of federal regulation behind conflict of laws in
aviation, it is important to consider those articles previously writ-
ten about uniform conflict of laws proposals and their critiques.
Some scholars have proposed general federal action to regu-
late all conflict of laws issues, since the analysis concerns the in-
terests of multiple states.68 Others have proposed federal
recommendations on a uniform conflict of laws approach under
a format similar to that of the Uniform Commercial Code or
even possibly the need for a new Restatement.69 Some scholars
have restricted conflict of laws reform and have only advocated
for the change within federal courts,70 while other approaches
TRAVEL, https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/worlds-busiest-flight-routes/index
.html [https://perma.cc/7KVX-TB2M] (last updated Sept. 13, 2018).
65 Cagle, supra note 18, at 953 (discussing international air travel but still pro-
viding applicable research on the domestic conflict of laws system).
66 Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1014.
67 See, e.g., id. at 1010–11.
68 See, e.g., Witte, supra note 2, at 622. See generally Donald T. Trautman, The
Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105 (1977).
69 See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DI-
RECTIONS 185–89 (1991) (exploring the idea of a new Restatement of Conflict of
Laws); Kramer, supra note 21, at 2134, 2146–49 (endorsing an approach similar
to the Uniform Commercial Code); see also Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1014; Witte,
supra note 2, at 622 (explaining various suggestions to improve the current con-
flict of laws system in America).
70 See, e.g., Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp, supra note 60, at 19.
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push for congressional regulation of the entire system,71 similar
to but more broad than the approach proposed in this Com-
ment. While one proposal explores a similar application for a
uniform approach, it advocates such uniformity under a differ-
ent source of congressional authority—the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.72 These approaches vary in many ways, but there is one
common theme: recognition of a problem with the current state
of the conflict of laws system in America.73 And at the same time,
they miss one key feature explored here: aviation-specific issues
and a need for reform in this particular area of the law.
However, one scholar, Willis L.M. Reese, put forth an extreme
set of rules written particularly for choice of law issues in aircraft
accidents.74 This proposal applies strictly to aviation accidents,
and it provides these plaintiffs with a great amount of flexibility
within the choice of law rules.75 These rules allow for plaintiffs
to “maximize recovery,”76 but they have been met with some
harsh criticism due to inconsistencies within them.77 While this
system promotes a unique application of choice of law rules in
aviation cases, it also misses a few important issues: (1) federal
regulation of the law as a strong source of authority behind the
rules; and (2) the importance of predictability and uniformity in
the conflict of laws system.78 Reese’s extreme, conservative rules
fit the same aspirations of this Comment—providing a conflict
of laws approach to aviation cases specifically—but they fail to
consider the prevalent issues of modern-day conflict of laws or
to provide an approach broad enough to encompass those avia-
tion cases which do not result from an accident.79
71 See, e.g., id.
72 See Witte, supra note 2, at 640.
73 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 2146–49.
74 See generally Willis L.M. Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1303 (1982).
75 See Gill, supra note 3, at 236.
76 Id. at 237.
77 See id. at 236.
78 Reese argues these are not of “particular significance” to the choice of law in
tort. Willis L.M. Reese, American Choice of Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 135 (1982);
see also Gill, supra note 3, at 236.
79 Compare Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, supra note 74, and
Reese, American Choice of Law, supra note 78 and accompanying text, with infra
Section VI (analyzing the proposed approach for conflicts of law cases regarding
aviation).
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IV. DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO FEDERALLY
REGULATE AVIATION CONFLICTS
OF LAW CASES?
After establishing the need for uniform regulation of conflict
of laws rules in aviation cases, one must now turn to the plausi-
bility of this actually occurring. In order to avoid constitutional
challenges, the question must be asked—does Congress possess
the authority to federally legislate rules for aviation conflicts of
law cases? Simply put, because aviation is, by its very nature, “in-
terstate commerce,” legislative authority is granted by the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution,80 and Congress can apply a
universal approach to conflict of laws in multistate aviation
cases. But to establish such a rule in an area of the law histori-
cally governed at the state level,81 a constitutional analysis of the
application of a uniform conflict of laws approach must be
undertaken.
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause vests in Congress the right “[t]o regu-
late commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States . . . .”82 Broadly speaking, “to regulate” means “to make
regular.”83 Thus, Congress has the power to make rules specify-
ing “how to do a particular activity.”84 “Commerce” has been de-
fined by scholars narrowly as “the trade or exchange of goods
(including the means of transporting them)”85 or broadly as
“gainful activities.”86 Under each of these definitions,87 and
80 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
81 See Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1715, 1716–17 (1992) (referencing Justice Story’s view of conflict of laws and
Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916)).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101, 139 (2001) (citing 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (J.F. Rivington et al. eds., 6th ed. 1785)).
84 Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,
55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 863 (2003).
85 See, e.g., Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, supra note 83, at
146.
86 See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve
State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1999).
87 Use of both of these definitions highlights the point that aviation falls under
both; however, some scholars argue that these are mutually exclusive definitions,
and that one overrides the other. See Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, supra note 83, at 102–05.
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others offered, the word “commerce” almost always has some
economic meaning.88 The Commerce Clause grants Congress
the power to “regulate . . . among the several States,” meaning
“‘between state and state’ or between persons in one state and
persons in another.”89 “In sum, Congress has power to specify
rules to govern the manner by which people may exchange or
trade goods from one state to another” and “to remove obstruc-
tions to domestic trade erected by states . . . .”90
Further, Congress’s power to authorize regulation under the
Commerce Clause can be divided into three general categories:
(1) regulation of “the channels of interstate commerce”; (2)
regulation and protection of “the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce”; and
(3) regulation of “activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.”91 This general understanding of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause can now be applied to rules
for interstate aviation cases generally.
B. FROM THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO CHOICE OF LAW
REGULATION IN MULTISTATE AVIATION CASES
For Congress to validly exercise its power under the Com-
merce Clause, the activity regulated must, in fact, be interstate
commerce under one of the three general categories given
above.92 Interstate commerce “does not . . . consist in transporta-
tion simply. It includes the purchase and sale of articles that are
intended to be transported from one State to another—every
species of commercial intercourse among the States and with
foreign nations.”93
While interstate travel via planes and trains typically falls
within the realm of the Commerce Clause,94 standing alone, the
88 See, e.g., Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, supra note 83, at
146.
89 Id. at 137 (highlighting the difference between this definition and “com-
merce that ‘concerns’ more than one state, or even commerce between persons
of same state that somehow ‘concerns’ other states”).
90 Id. at 146.
91 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (first citing Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (for all three categories); and then citing NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 57 (1937) (for category three)).
92 See id.
93 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94 Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison:
The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1692
(2002). See generally Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (aircraft); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
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presence of conflict between multiple states is not enough to
satisfy the requirements for federal legislation under the Com-
merce Clause.95 Rather, some form of commerce must be in-
volved. Typically, interstate aviation cases involve the purchase
and sale of a ticket used for access to transportation across state
lines. This is enough to fall under the Commerce Clause domin-
ion. Aviation involving multistate interaction sits neatly within
the second general category of the Commerce Clause power:
regulation and protection of the “instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce.”96
Not only are planes and people traveling interstate “instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce” but they are also “persons or
things in interstate commerce.”
Congressional power to regulate interstate aviation conflict of
laws issues is further demonstrated by an analysis of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power as applied to the aviation realm. The
federal government is already a very visible and dominant force
in the aviation industry.97 As Justice Jackson emphasized, planes
“move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection,
in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intri-
cate system of federal commands. . . . Its privileges, rights and
protection . . . [are] owe[d] to the Federal Government alone
and not to any state government.”98 Because this type of inter-
state activity falls under the power of Congress by the nature of
being “commerce among the several States which Congress may
regulate,”99 Congress has the power to create rules for aviation
suits that involve multistate commerce, which will inform judges
and attorneys of the conflict of laws procedure for these cases.
Also, the purchase and sale of tickets, the economic conduct
inherent to interstate aviation, and the aviation industry’s “gain-
ful activity” all qualify as “commerce” under its precise defini-
U.S. 761 (1945) (railroad cars); Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States
(Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (railroad rates).
95 Cf. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16–17 (explaining the three categories under which an
activity must fall into to be considered a regulatable activity under the Commerce
Clause).
96 See id. (meeting the criteria laid out in the decision).
97 Examples of federal involvement under the Commerce Clause include: fed-
eral licensing of airmen, federal control of air traffic control, and federal licens-
ing and registration of aircrafts. See Edward A. Harriman, Federal and State
Jurisdiction with Reference to Aircraft, 2 J. AIR L. & COM. 299, 303–04 (1931).
98 Nw. Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
99 See supra notes 82–98 and accompanying text.
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tion. In fact, common carriers and commercial transportation
easily fit into multiple categories of commerce, as they are “inte-
gral to the sale and production of goods”; “a service provided
for a fee”; and “a means of transacting commerce.”100 Further,
aviation meets the standard of “among the several states” be-
cause flights from one state to another, or even business transac-
tions between persons from different states in the aviation
industry, qualify as activity “ ‘between state and state’ or between
persons in one state and persons in another.”101
While the Supreme Court has recently limited Congress’s abil-
ity to regulate under the Commerce Clause, there is no evidence
that such limitations would stop Congress from being able to
regulate aviation-specific conflict of laws issues.102 In fact, when
the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Commerce Clause
in United States v. Lopez, it specifically endorsed the continuation
of congressional regulation of interstate activity via planes and
trains.103 As one scholar explained, the Supreme Court “has left
the essence of Congress’s power to regulate multistate commer-
cial transactions intact.”104 Congress maintains “the right to reg-
ulate any person or entity involved in the business of
transportation (e.g., ships, railroads, trucks, and airplanes) be-
cause (1) providing transportation for a fee is ‘commerce,’ and
100 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 86, at 108–09 (explaining categories of a wide
range of subjects that “commerce” covers).
101 See Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, supra note 83, at
137. Congressional Commerce Clause authority over aviation is further sup-
ported by other examples of aviation legislation by Congress. See generally Harri-
man, supra note 97.
102 See Whitten, supra note 31, at 584 (first citing United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (summarizing the opinion as “holding the federal Violence
Against Women Act beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
on the grounds that gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activ-
ity”); and then citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59, 561–62
(1995) (which held that “the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act [was] beyond
the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause because no economic activity
was involved, but recognizing the legitimacy of Congress regulating the use of
channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, and also recognizing
the power of Congress to provide for a jurisdictional element in a statute that
would ensure a case-by-case inquiry that a particular activity in fact affects inter-
state commerce”)).
103 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (“Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”)
(citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
342 (1914); So. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)).
104 Whitten, supra note 31, at 584.
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(2) even intrastate transit often affects commerce among the
states, as the Court has long recognized.”105
C. ANOTHER ROUTE: THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Congressional authority also includes the “power to . . . re-
move obstructions to domestic trade erected by states” under
the Dormant Commerce Clause.106 While there is some lack of
clarity and increased controversy regarding the Court’s applica-
tion of the Dormant Commerce Clause, it is still a tool to be
used today.107 This power could quite possibly include federal
regulation of conflict of laws issues in aviation cases due to the
obstructions to trade caused by the problems behind the com-
plicated conflict of laws system. If Congress chose not to use the
Commerce Clause to invoke its authority over aviation choice of
law cases, the Dormant Commerce Clause might provide an-
other route.
Specifically, “[t]he ‘Dormant Commerce Clause’ refers to the
prohibition, implicit in the Commerce Clause, against states
passing legislation that discriminates against or excessively bur-
dens interstate commerce.”108 States cannot burden trade,
which may be a way around any Commerce Clause issues over
federal regulation of aviation conflict of laws. “[A] state cannot
impose an unreasonable burden on [interstate commerce]. . . .
This implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on the authority of the
states to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce . . . pre-
cludes state regulation in certain areas ‘even absent congres-
sional action.’”109 Thus, under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
a state cannot do anything that may impose a “substantial bur-
105 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 86, at 119 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824)).
106 Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, supra note 83, at 146.
107 Compare Note, Functional Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1537, 1537–38 (1997) (explaining some of the controversy and
the clarity issues with the Dormant Commerce Clause), and Jeremy R. Jehangiri,
Note, The Dowling Thesis Revisited: Professor Dowling and Justice Scalia, 49 S.D. L.
REV. 867, 876–78 (2004) (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s use of a balancing
approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause), with Daniel Francis, The Decline of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV. 255, 257, 272 (2017) (suggesting
using the Dormant Commerce Clause might be slipping away with the passing of
time).
108 Commerce Clause, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/commerce_clause [https://perma.cc/546M-FJHU] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2019).
109 8 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1439(1) (11th ed. 2019) (first
citing S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1984); and
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den[ ] on interstate [and foreign] commerce” unless authorized
by Congress.110
With respect to aviation cases and interstate carriers generally,
the Supreme Court has held that “[a] state cannot fix rates or
otherwise regulate interstate carriers that cross state borders, or
even those carriers operating entirely within the borders of the
state, where they carry goods in the flow of interstate commerce
and hence, constitute local links in the chain of commerce.”111
Thus, if the courts or Congress were to determine that the cur-
rent conflict of laws system poses such a burden on the airline
industry that it amounts to a substantial burden on interstate
commerce,112 Congress may be able to regulate the industry to
avoid the burden imposed by extreme variations in conflict of
laws approaches.
While it might be a stretch to use the Dormant Commerce
Clause as the grounds for enacting federal conflict of laws regu-
lation, the system of conflict of laws in the United States, as cur-
rently regulated by the individual states, can still arguably be
described as burdening interstate commerce. This burden is
highlighted by the three prevalent issues of the current conflict
of laws system in aviation cases.113
D. BUT IS THIS STATE TERRITORY?
Choice of law rules and the application of those rules have
been historically treated as state law.114 Yet, federal regulation
may be necessary and is indeed allowed when state interests are
at war.115 As the Supreme Court explained, “controversies con-
cerning rights in interstate streams . . . have been recognized as
presenting federal questions.”116 While either federal or state
then quoting Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 262 (Ct. App.
2002)).
110 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 98.
111 WITKIN, supra note 109, § 1439(2) (citations omitted).
112 Cf. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1946) (regarding state law
requiring segregation on a carrier); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769–73
(1945) (regarding the state law limiting the number of train cars on trains travel-
ing through Arizona). Each of these cases involved the Supreme Court analyzing
restrictions on a form of transportation to determine whether the state laws
amounted to “substantial burden” on interstate commerce.
113 See supra notes 24–50 and accompanying text.
114 See Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 1716.
115 Cf. id. at 1737 & n.98 (explaining the federal role to regulate where “state
interests collide”) (citing Hinderlider v. LaPlata River Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)).
116 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110.
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regulation of conflict of laws in the aviation industry may be ap-
propriate and constitutional, Congress’s choice to regulate this
field would override any state regulation in one broad sweep.117
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state courts
would be obligated to enforce the federal regulation, “in the
absence of a valid excuse,” even if they disagree with the sub-
stance of such regulation.118 To clarify, state courts would have
no procedural issue applying federal law to state court cases, as
explained by the Supreme Court:
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress
has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened
or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum—
although both might well be true—but because the Constitution
and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as
laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes
those laws “the supreme Law of the Land,” and charges state
courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law accord-
ing to their regular modes of procedure. “The laws of the United
States are laws in several States, and just as much binding on the
citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. . . . The two
together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the
law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdic-
tions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each
other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdic-
tion partly different and partly concurrent.119
The Supreme Court has stressed that as a fundamental principle
of federalism, state courts have a mutual duty to apply, uphold,
and enforce federal law.120 This idea is fundamental to the
Supremacy Clause and the scope of government general author-
ity, as explained by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers:
“The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own
local or municipal laws . . . and as parts of one whole, the infer-
ence seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a
concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the
Union . . . .”121
117 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
118 See, e.g., Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 382 & n.12 (2012).
119 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (citing Clafin v. Houseman, 93
U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876)).
120 See id. at 372–73.
121 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 132 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord
Borne ed., 1901); see also Howlett, 496 U.S. at 368–69.
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Congress has even expressed an interest in federal regulation
of conflict of laws issues.122 While states have held the grasp on
conflict of laws regulation in America since the creation of the
states themselves,123 federal regulation of this area of the law for
aviation cases is practical, constitutional, and quite possibly be-
coming primed for legislative action.
V. SOME PUSHBACK
It has been shown and is fair to say that, while the current
conflict of laws system has received its share of critique and sug-
gestions, it is not alone in that respect. As mentioned, a uniform
system for all conflict of laws is not novel and has been explored
in many avenues by different choice of law scholars and practic-
ing attorneys.124 This means that the idea has also received some
scrutiny by those with different suggestions or with opposing
views that the current system should stay in place. These objec-
tions to a federally regulated, uniform set of conflict of laws
rules are explained and rebutted in this Section.
A. NATIONAL SUGGESTION RATHER THAN FEDERAL REGULATION
Some scholars have suggested Uniform Commercial Code or
restatement-style rules should be adopted by each state individu-
ally, rather than a single piece of federal, binding legislation.125
A large number of choice of law scholars promote the American
Law Institute as the most appropriate group to take on such a
complicated task and provide work that is applicable and pro-
motes state interests.126 A third restatement on conflict of laws,
some argue, would provide the most comprehensive, broad, and
easily applicable conflict of laws solutions.127 As Lea Brilmayer
explains in her conflict of laws textbook: “[Restatements] can
cover a broad enough range of topics to link issues on which
some states stand to benefit with issues on which the others do
122 See Solimine, supra note 49, at 90 (“Indeed, Congress seems increasingly
interested in choice of law problems”). But see Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and
the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 424 (1980).
123 See Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 1716.
124 See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 2134, 2144 & n.23, 2147.
126 See id. at 2147–48 (“Most choice of law scholars assume that the ideal body
to resolve choice of law problems is the American Law Institute, which has pro-
vided the twentieth century’s most widely used approaches to choice of law.”).
127 See BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 185.
2019] CONFLICT OF LAWS 567
. . . [and] can be drafted to cover a wide enough range of con-
tingencies to give clear guidance.”128
However, this approach would only work if all states were to
enact the restatement or similar guidance as their own laws.
States are not required to adopt the restatement or any other
form of legal explanations.129 Uniform laws, on the other hand,
would provide greater authority and certainty that each state
would be bound by the newly established rules.130 Further, as
pointed out by Professor Kramer in his critique of a restatement-
like approach to conflict of laws reform, the function of a re-
statement is “to restate the law, to identify ‘as nearly as may be
the rules which our courts will apply today.’”131 While the Amer-
ican Law Institute may have the experience, time, and experts
available to craft a delicately stated conflict of laws approach, its
lack of mandatory authority over the states and its function in
only “restating” the law would hinder the effectiveness of new
conflict of laws rules.
B. LEAVE IT TO THE STATES
Although one author recognized that the current “choice of
law system in the United States is far from ideal,” he claimed
that getting the “legislative and judicial decisionmakers” in-
volved would be “ventur[ing] into the unknown.”132 Rather than
take a proposed solution and work to make the system more
efficient and just, Witte settled on “hold[ing] on to what they’ve
got” and keeping the system as-is.133 Yet by doing this, Witte is
not able to overcome his own critiques of the current conflict of
laws system in America. As he explained: “Each state seems to
apply a different standard in a different fashion. This leads to
claims of forum shopping, unpredictability, uncertainty, bias to-
ward state interests, and nonuniformity—just to name a few of
the problems.”134 Another critic explained the situation a little
differently, exposing some of the main problems with the cur-
128 Id.
129 See Suzanne Ehrenberg & Susan Valentine, Lecture Notes for Restatements of the
Law, CHI.-KENT C. L. (1999), http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/lrw/tutorials/
restate.htm [https://perma.cc/27GH-RU7J].
130 See Kramer, supra note 21, at 2148.
131 See id. (quoting William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law Institute
and the First Restatement of the Law: “How We Did It,” in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS
19 (perm. ed. 1945)).
132 Witte, supra note 2, at 658–59.
133 Id. at 659.
134 Id. at 658.
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rent system, while actually advancing the notion that things are
better left untouched: “No system is perfect, but it could be
worse. Although the simplification of choice of law is a worth-
while goal, the result could possibly be more complex. It’s like
the monster in the closet: if you leave it alone, you’ll be O.K.”135
Yet, as this Comment and others have noted, the issues that
have risen from the current conflict of laws system are too worri-
some and prevalent, especially in the field of aviation, to over-
look.136 Turning a blind eye and allowing the states to sort it out,
as it has been done for years, is not effective and comes as a loss
to potential litigants. Providing uniform conflict of laws rules for
aviation cases through federal regulation will ensure the cer-
tainty and predictability that the current system cannot offer
and begin a new era of a fairer conflict of laws system for liti-
gants and a more consistent and employable system to be ap-
plied by the courts.
C. IS CONGRESS STANDING IN ITS OWN WAY?
As analyzed above, Congress has a strong argument for its
power to federally legislate aviation choice of law rules—so why
have they not done so? While some may try to fight using Com-
merce Clause power for such regulation, it would likely hold up
in a court of law. Yet, interested parties, such as greedy plaintiffs
(and their attorneys), federalism activists, and individual states,
may be to blame for the lack of congressional action in this area.
Without support from constituents and the industry in general,
Congress is unlikely to make any changes and is, in a sense,
standing in its own way of passing any sort of uniform regulation
for conflict of laws in aviation.
Plaintiffs like choosing their own forums, and more specifi-
cally, they like having a handful of jurisdictions from which to
choose.137 Plaintiff’s counsel may base an entire case strategy
around choice of law and trying to prevent removal to a less-
135 Id. (interviewing a Department of Justice attorney).
136 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21; supra section II.A–C.
137 See Albert R. Abramson, Where to Sue in Aviation Products Liability Cases, 40 J.
AIR L. & COM. 369, 370–71 (1974); see, e.g., Aviation Accidents Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, RAPOPORT WEISBERG & SIMS P.C., https://www.rapoportlaw.com/Practice-
Areas/Aviation-Accidents/Aviation-Accidents-FAQ.shtml#file-lawsuit [https://
perma.cc/N68G-86YC] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (considering damage caps and
“the broadest range of damages for the individual injuries suffered” as factors to
determine where to file an aviation accident suit).
2019] CONFLICT OF LAWS 569
favorable jurisdiction.138 If Congress were to pass a uniform ap-
proach to the choice of law rules for aviation cases, this would
take away a large amount of the control plaintiffs have in the
outcome of a case. The men and women of Congress would
have to balance this possible concern of the plaintiffs and plain-
tiffs’ attorneys in their representative areas before advocating
for a plan that may take away what some may call plaintiffs’
rights (but what could interchangeably be referred to as im-
proper forum shopping) in choosing a venue (and likely also
the laws that govern the case).
Another concern that would likely be raised if Congress were
to push for federal regulation of choice of law in aviation cases
(and is a frequent rebuttal to congressional regulation in any
industry): federalism concerns by both the common person and
individual states wanting to hold onto power in the choice of law
realm. With states having long regulated the choice of law
field,139 it would be natural for Congress to face some pushback
for taking these procedures away from the states. Such argu-
ments may contend that Congress’s power to regulate in such a
way is not provided for under the Commerce Clause. However,
Congress would likely overcome any constitutional federalism
challenges based on the Commerce Clause, as discussed above,
since aviation and, more specifically, economically driven avia-
tion activities, have endured through other Commerce Clause
limitations.140 Other federalism challenges, however, may stand
a chance to at least be heard by the Supreme Court of the
United States.141
VI. APPLICATION OF ONE CONFLICT OF LAWS
APPROACH TO AVIATION CASES
A. ONE CHOICE OF LAW APPROACH, FEDERALLY REGULATED,
FOR AVIATION-SPECIFIC CASES
So, what would a singular, uniform, federally regulated con-
flict of laws approach look like for aviation cases? With so many
different approaches used and the controversy surrounding
138 See generally Abramson, supra note 137 (explaining strategy and litigation
tips for finding the best plaintiff-friendly venue in aviation cases).
139 See Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 1716.
140 See supra notes 83–105 and accompanying text.
141 See Paul Boudreaux, A Case for Recognizing Unenumerated Powers of Congress, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 561–62 (2006) (explaining the Supreme
Court’s greater acceptance of federalism concerns in the modern era).
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which is truly the “best,”142 an entirely separate paper, or per-
haps book, would be needed to explore which approach is in-
deed the most suitable and appropriate for conflicts of law cases,
especially when narrowing the application to aviation-specific
cases. This does not hinder the argument for a uniform applica-
tion, regardless of the approach chosen, assuming it is a well-
researched, established approach, like one of the five methodol-
ogies.143 Having uniformity and predictability in conflict of laws
in aviation cases will provide better results generally than the
current system of scattered approaches throughout the
country.144
Practically speaking, applying one conflict of laws approach to
all cases involving interstate aviation suits in an effort to maxi-
mize state and litigant interests will not be easy,145 but it will
likely lead to success for the goals of forum shopping deter-
rence, predictability in cases, and treating like cases alike. While
it is true that litigants will never be able to completely predict or
know the outcome of their case beforehand, offering a uniform
approach to conflicts issues will allow more accurate case analy-
sis to be conducted on behalf of the litigants.146 This change to
the procedural process for cases with conflicts of laws may take
some time for courts to become comfortable applying; however,
with so many courts applying the same standard to interstate avi-
ation cases, there will likely be a quick accumulation of legal
analysis by scholars as well as thorough explanation of applica-
tions in case opinions. As Professor Kramer explained, “[a] cen-
tralized decisionmaking body can consider a wide array of
problems simultaneously, make necessary or appropriate issue
linkages, and produce a complete system of rules. States may
142 See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Conflicts, the Constitution, and the Internet, 86 ILL.
B.J. 502, 502 (1998) (“There are basically five conflict-of-law methodologies: (1)
the traditional or Restatement (First) approach; (2) the ‘most significant contact’
or Restatement (Second) approach; (3) the government-interest approach; (4)
the Leflar approach; and (5) the forum approach. Some states use variations or
combinations of these approaches.”).
143 Id.
144 However, one author notes that some scholars have suggested that a “feder-
alized version of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws” would be the
front-runner for Congress’s pick of an approach to federalize. Linda S. Mullenix,
Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28
(1992).
145 See Kramer, supra note 21, at 2146–47.
146 See Osbeck, supra note 41, at 46–47.
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then sign onto this system . . . [and] each state’s use of such a
code could be made contingent on . . . other states.”147
B. WHY AVIATION?
This Comment has focused on the need for federal regulation
of conflict of laws rules for aviation while only focusing on why
this regulation should be aviation specific. As mentioned before,
the nature of most interstate aviation cases entails a variety of
uncontrollable factors for which potential litigants have no say
in and sometimes no awareness of.148 Additionally, the nature of
the aircraft industry increases the complexity of suits because
aircraft are mobile and the industry employs a “relatively large
number of prospective defendants in multiple jurisdictions who
are directly associated with the design, construction, operation
and maintenance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and component
parts.” An even larger number of possible plaintiffs also move
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.149 Tragedies involving air travel
“often involve a confusing myriad of methodologies because of
consolidated claims initially filed in multiple courts by multiple
plaintiffs and multiple defendants from multiple jurisdic-
tions.”150 These complex cases raise equally complex choice of
law issues.151
These issues are most easily illustrated in the form of an exam-
ple. For instance, a flight from Los Angeles, California, to New
York City, New York, may fly over a number of states. A passen-
ger may not realize that they are subject to multiple state laws,
much less know which state they may even be flying over. If two
separate plaintiffs are on two planes from California to New
York on the same day and Plaintiff A’s plane flies on a more
northern flight pattern compared to Plaintiff B’s flight, which
lies slightly to the south, each of these plaintiffs may be subject
to different state laws and different choice of law approaches in
each of these states. It would be unfair, should some drastic,
suit-causing event occur on both planes, that one plaintiff would
have an advantage to win their suit merely because the plane
took a route that entailed submitting to laws of one list of states,
147 Kramer, supra note 21, at 2147.
148 See Cagle, supra note 18, at 975 (“The notion of fortuity is particularly rele-
vant in aviation accident cases. During a flight a traveler may pass through several
states, or a plane may crash in a state the passenger never intended to cross.”).
149 See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 1006.
150 Id. at 1005.
151 See id.
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while the other plaintiff has subjected itself to a different list of
state laws. It would also be unfair to apply an entirely different
conflicts approach for another plaintiff on Plaintiff A’s flight
merely due to the state the plaintiff is from or another fortui-
tous factor. To let these types of uncontrollable and fortuitous
factors play into the substantive issues in a trial is an inequitable
and imbalanced form of “justice.”152
More practically speaking, however, are two main effects that
the aviation industry that would see if federal regulation was en-
acted: (1) a decrease in airline lawsuit complication and specu-
lation; and (2) an increase in aviation industry efficiency. First,
plaintiffs would not have to worry about what choice of law rules
they would be subject to just by stepping onto an airplane in one
state and getting off the same airplane in another. Having one
choice of law approach across the entire country would provide
plaintiffs with some form of stability in bringing a case, as the
plaintiff would know how the choice of law rules would be ap-
plied beforehand. Second, this predictability would allow air-
lines and air travel companies to work more efficiently without
worrying about subjecting itself to unfavorable conflict of laws
rules. Under one uniform approach to these rules, these compa-
nies would know up-front what laws by which it would need to
abide and can appropriately operate without having to plan to
avoid bad state laws.
Could this approach be applied more broadly to include all
common carriers traveling through the interstate system? Quite
possibly, yes. Litigants typically have little or no knowledge of,
and likely no control over, the states and laws to which they are
subject while traveling via airplane. Conversely, travel on land is
more predictable and plaintiffs can determine the states
through which they may travel and easily avoid them, most of
the time.153
152 See supra note 98 and accompanying text; cf. Cagle, supra note 18, at 988–99.
153 This is a very generalized statement and should not be taken too literally.
The author understands that traveling to some destinations requires travel
through particular areas that one cannot simply avoid. It is also noted that the
average litigant has no understanding, or even initial care, to research and deter-
mine favorable and undesirable state laws for their next road trip route.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The idea that all victims of one air disaster should be treated
alike is not a new proposition,154 but the federal regulation in-
troduced in this Comment could be the start toward more con-
sistent aviation choice of law cases. Aviation cases do not deserve
special treatment in this area because it is a profitable, leading
industry in the United States, but rather quite the opposite. Air-
lines and air travelers are at a uniquely high risk of unfair bias
and unpredictable application of law due to the complicated
and unpredictable nature of the current conflict of laws system.
This is amplified by the generally unpredictable nature of the
aviation industry (uncontrollable flight patterns, accidental inju-
ries caused in fortuitous locations, etc.).155
After reading this Comment, it should be evident that Con-
gress holds the power and is best suited to provide the solution
to this problem within the current American legal system. Be-
cause aviation is, by its very nature, interstate commerce, under
the federal government’s Commerce Clause authority, Congress
can and should apply a universal approach to conflicts of laws in
multistate aviation cases to bring predictability, simplicity, and
uniformity to conflict of laws issues in these cases. While drafting
and passing legislation for the enactment of this Comment’s
proposed approach is not an easy task, it is necessary and vital to
ensuring justice is served in this particular line of cases. In fact,
“[a]viation tort law in the United States has been instrumental
in highlighting the shortcomings of the traditional contacts-
based approaches to conflict of laws.”156
In an effort to reduce forum shopping, provide predictability,
and treat like cases alike in the interests of justice, Congress
should adopt a uniform approach for conflicts of law cases re-
garding interstate aviation activity. While some critics have
voiced negative opinions regarding the application of a federally
regulated, uniform approach to conflict of laws in interstate avi-
ation cases, that disapproval is trumped by the need for conflict
of laws reform in the United States. As demonstrated in this
Comment, the current system is not working, especially not for
multijurisdictional aviation cases.
154 See 2 C.G.J. MORSE, TORTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (R.H.
Graveson ed., 1978) (advocating for “the notion that all victims of one air disaster
should be treated alike”); see also Gill, supra note 3, at 238.
155 Cf. Gill, supra note 3, at 238.
156 Id.
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As one district judge explained over thirty years ago, the
“choice of law problems inherent in air crash and mass disaster
litigation cry out for federal statutory resolution. We urge Con-
gress to pursue enactment of uniform federal tort law to apply
to liability and damages in the context of commercial airline di-
sasters and other mass torts.”157 Enough time has since passed.
More problems have surfaced. Courts are struggling to apply the
law, and the litigants are suffering as a result. There is one solu-
tion, as proposed in this Comment, that will be most effective in
bringing change to aviation litigation—federal regulation of
conflict of laws issues. Congress can change the landscape for
conflict of laws rules in aviation litigation under the Commerce
Clause, and it should do so soon.158
157 In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1454
(D. Colo. 1988).
158 In fact, there is already movement toward “creating uniform substantive
rules to deal with air transport.” See Gill, supra note 3, at 238.
